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Measuring value creation by comparing the RAROC of an exposure (the return on 
risk capital) with a single institution-wide hurdle rate is inconsistent with the 
standard theory of financial valuation. We use asset pricing theory to determine 
the appropriate hurdle rate for such a RAROC performance measure. We find that 
this hurdle rate varies with the skewness of asset returns. Thus the RAROC hurdle 
rate should differ substantially between equity which has a right skew and debt 
which has a pronounced left skew and also between different qualities of debt 
exposure. We discuss implications for financial institution risk management and 
supervision. 
 
Keywords: asset pricing, banking, capital allocation, capital budgeting, capital 
management, corporate finance, downside risk, economic capital, performance 
measurement, RAROC, risk management, value creation, hurdle rate, value at risk 
 
JEL classification numbers: G22, G31  
4 
Riskisopeutettujen tuottojen käyttö rahoituslaitosten 
arvonluonnin mittaamisessa 
Suomen Pankin keskustelualoitteita 25/2009 
Alistair Milne – Mario Onorato 




Rahoituslaitoksen arvonluontia mitataan usein vertaamalla investointiposition 
riskisopeutettua tuottoa yhteen instituution tason kynnystuottoon. Tällainen me-
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vien tavanomaisten teorioiden kanssa. Tässä tutkimuksessa hyödynnetään varalli-
suuden hinnoitteluteoriaa, jotta saadaan määritetyksi järkevä kynnystuotto, johon 
riskikorjattuihin tuottoihin perustuvaa tulosta voidaan puolestaan verrata. Kynnys-
tuoton osoitetaan tarkasteluissa riippuvan varallisuuden tuottojakauman vinoudes-
ta. Tästä puolestaan seuraa, että oman pääoman riskikorjatun tuoton kynnys poik-
keaa merkittävästi velkapääoman kynnystuotosta, koska oman pääoman tuotto-
jakauma on vino oikealle ja velkapääoman tuottojakauma vino vasemmalle. 
Tuloksen merkitystä arvioidaan rahoituslaitosten riskienhallinnan ja rahoitus-
valvonnan kannalta. 
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Most of the world’s large and internationally active financial institutions now use 
their risk-management systems for assessing risk-return tradeoffs. This practice is 
described as ‘economic capital management’ or ‘capital allocation’.
1 The most 
widely used capital allocation based value measure is RAROC, the ratio of 
expected revenues on a particular exposure to its contribution to institution-wide 
risk capital.
2 The numerator is expected returns over some time horizon (usually 
one year) net of all operational and funding costs. The denominator – risk capital 
– is an exposure-specific measure of tail risk quantified using a combination of 
models, including VaR for market risk, Credit-VaR models for credit risk and 
other models of extreme losses from operational risk. 
  RAROC is nowadays actively promoted both by the consultancy industry and 
by regulators, for a wide range of applications, in commercial and investment 
banking, asset management and insurance. In order for financial institutions to be 
able to use their own internal models as part of the more advanced calculations of 
regulatory capital in pillar 1 of the Basel II accord, these models must pass a ‘use 
test’ ie they must be actively used by the bank for managing its own portfolio, not 
just constructed specifically for regulatory compliance. The new Solvency II 
regulations for European insurance companies, which introduce similar 
approaches to capital regulation as Basel II for banks, provide similar 
encouragement for capital allocation. As a number of consultancy studies 
document RAROC has become the most widely applied tool of financial valuation 
around the world, used by financial services firms for supporting decisions on 
portfolio allocations, business mix, product pricing, and employee remuneration.
3 
                                                 
1 The major consultancy companies are a good source of information on how financial institutions 
apply these methods, see for example KPMG (2004) and PWC-EIU (2005) on their use in business 
management and Ernst and Young (2005) on their role in investor disclosure. For a recent 
published collection of practitioner writing see Dav (ed) (2006). 
2 Matten (2000, pp 146–166) describes RAROC alongside several related performance measures. 
The various acronyms (RAROC, RORAC, RARORAC, etc.) are not applied by practitioners in an 
entirely consistent manner. While RAROC is the most common acronym for the most commonly 
used measure, the one that we discuss in this paper, this same measure is frequently referred to by 
other names and acronyms, and the term RAROC is also applied to other related performance 
measures. 
3 Smithson (2002), page 266, reports that 78% of the respondents to his 2002 Rutter Associates 
survey of credit portfolio managers, used RAROC to evaluate the performance of their portfolio of 
credit assets. PWC-EIU (2005), covering more than 200 medium sized and large banks and 
insurance companies worldwide, finds that more than half now conduct such capital allocation and 
most use the resulting return measures for various purposes, including business decision making, 
product pricing, and the determination of bonuses. They write that ‘economic capital is fast 
gaining critical mass within the industry’. A more recent 2006 update of this survey shows even 
greater adoption. Asset managers also make widespread use of RAROC as a performance measure 
when acting on behalf of both retail and institutional investors.  
8 
  One reason for the widespread appeal of RAROC for making risk-return 
decisions is that happens to be consistent with the most tractable version of 
standard financial theory routinely taught in most MBA finance classes. Under the 
standard but rather implausible class room assumption that all returns are 
normally distributed, then the RAROC denominator – value at risk – measures the 
contribution of every exposure to aggregate portfolio risk. Return relative to 
aggregate portfolio risk can then be optimized by setting a single portfolio wide 
RAROC hurdle. These same assumptions also allow the standard capital asset 
pricing model (CAPM) to be derived in an especially straightforward way that 
even those with little previous exposure to financial theory can follow. 
  This is however a very special case. Our analysis is based instead on the well 
developed standard theory of financial valuation that does not make any 
assumptions about return distributions. This theory, beginning with the 
contributions of Markovitz and of Arrow, teaches us that if investors are rational, 
risk-averse, and can exchange exposures freely with each other without significant 
trading costs, then they will all agree on a present value for any tradable financial 
asset (if not then there are unexploited gains from trade). This present value 
should then depend only on the returns of the financial asset conditional on each 
possible outcome for aggregate economy wide output or market return.
4 This 
‘pricing kernel’, the negative relationship between investor’s valuation of asset 
returns and aggregate output or market return, can then be used to obtain present 
values for any financial asset. This pricing kernel is not unlike the standard 
CAPM (one general theoretical formulation is the ‘consumption-CAPM’ and even 
the standard CAPM corresponds to the special cases where all investors have 
quadratic preferences or all returns are normal). But as we shall demonstrate, 
using the pricing kernel, if there are differences in the shape of return distributions 
then return relative to aggregate portfolio risk is not optimized by setting a single 
portfolio wide RAROC hurdle.
5 
  The standard theory is far from perfect. It has not proved especially helpful to 
understanding asset price volatilities. Financial markets are incomplete and 
investors subject to trading constraints, so there will be some uninsured exposures 
to different states with the same aggregate payoffs and differences between 
investors in their valuation of these payoffs. But using RAROC with a single 
institution hurdle rate does not help correct financial valuation for any of these 
problems. 
  Our paper goes further, showing that these valuation distortions from using 
RAROC with a single hurdle rate for all types of exposure can be quantitatively 
extremely large. Consider for example a comparison between a debt and an equity 
                                                 
4 This is because risk averse investors can fully insure each with other for outcomes across states 
with the same level of aggregate output or market return. 
5 Formal proofs of the theoretical results presented in this paper are found in Milne and Onorato 
(2009).  
9 
portfolio. In this case there are substantial differences in RAROC hurdles between 
equity and debt exposures, and between debt of different ratings. This is because 
of the different skewness of their respective return distributions. Returns on 
equities are right skewed, implying that the volatility of returns is large relative to 
the risk capital. Defaultable debt, in contrast, is left skewed and has a low 
volatility of returns relative to risk capital. As a result the RAROC hurdle 
appropriate for a debt portfolio is very much lower than that for an equity 
portfolio, with the least risky investment grade debt having the lowest RAROC 
hurdles of all. 
  The implication is that if RAROC is to be used as a valuation tool then it 
requires exposure-specific hurdle rates, adjusted to correct for differences in 
skewness and higher moments of the return distribution. Exposures with relatively 
large left-hand tails should be subject to relatively lower RAROC hurdles. This is 
true even when investors value marginal returns especially highly when aggregate 
output is relatively low. 
  The paper is arranged as follows. Section 2 provides some further motivation 
and discusses some related contributions to the literature. Section 3 is a review of 
the relationship between valuation theory and the RAROC value metric, drawing 
on the contributions of Crouhy et al (1999) and Milne and Onorato (2009). Here 
we apply the ‘pricing kernel’, the valuation metric of standard asset pricing 
theory, to investigate the determinants of zero net present value RAROC hurdle 
rates. Section 3.1 sets out our notation and assumptions. Section 3.2 briefly 
summarizes the relevant asset pricing theory. Section 3.3 discusses the conditions 
under which different exposures can be compared using a single zero-NPV 
RAROC hurdle rate and how these hurdle rates are affected by skewness of 
exposures. Section 4 explores the quantitative implications of the results of 
Section 3, presenting calculations of zero-NPV RAROC hurdle rates showing 
these differ substantially between different exposures, under a range of 
assumptions about portfolio parameters, the RAROC threshold and investor 
preferences. Section 5 is a short conclusion. 
 
 
2  Motivation and literature review 
The use of capital modeling for the twin applications of default protection and for 
business management is widely promoted.
6 It is nevertheless somewhat surprising 
that financial institutions have developed their own distinct capital based 
performance measures, rather than using standard net present value tools used for 
                                                 
6 See for example Zaik et al (1996) who note that models of risk capital are used for both for 
finding the proportion of equity to assets that minimizes the cost of funding and for risk-return 
assessment.  
10 
example in project appraisal by non-financial companies. The most obvious 
reason is the importance of credit standing to financial institutions.
7 A further 
reason for the use of capital based performance measures – not much emphasized 
in the research literature – is that capital allocation can be relatively easily 
extended to the important non-funded off-balance sheet exposures of financial 
institutions, where for example the familiar method of internal rate of return 
cannot. This is why it is convenient to use capital, rather than funding, for setting 
limits on the positions taken by both business lines and individual employees. 
  If credit standing matters then a financial institution should make valuations 
relative to its own portfolio as well as to the market as a whole. There are two key 
academic articles exploring this point. Froot, Scharfstein and Stein (1993) point 
out that, faced with an increasing cost of raising external funds financial 
institutions will behave in a risk-averse fashion towards risks that are diversifiable 
at a market level. Specifically, a business unit’s contribution to aggregate earnings 
volatility will be an important factor in the capital allocation and capital structure 
decisions and also in the decision to hedge earnings risk. Capital structure, 
hedging and capital budgeting are therefore inextricably linked together. Froot 
and Stein (1998) demonstrate that in a two period model with linearly increasing 
costs of recapitalization that the hurdle rate for investments can be calculated from 
a two factor pricing model. Adopting their notation this can be written as the 
covariance of the return with the market Rm and with the risks of the existing 
portfolio RP, so the required return is given by μi = γcov(μi, Rm) + λcov(μi, RP) 
where γ is the market unit price of risk for the (market) priced factor Rm and λ is 
the unit cost for volatility of the portfolio ie they have a key practical message. 
Balance sheet and systematic risk must be separately priced. While not the focus 
of their analysis, their work suggests that incorporating systematic risk within a 
single measure such as RAROC is misguided because, even if as they assume 
returns are multivariate normally distributed, RP is not the same as Rm. 
  Our analysis complements that of Froot and Stein (1998). We show that if 
returns are not multivariate normally distributed then, even if there are no costs of 
recapitalization, a single hurdle RAROC cannot be used to price risk. Moreover if 
there are costs of recapitalization or other constraints on raising equity, then a two 
factor pricing model similar to that suggested by Froot and Stein (1998) can be 
useful. 
  Another related branch of literature is that on coherent measures of risk, 
initiated by Artzner et al (1999). They demonstrate that the RAROC Value at Risk 
denominator (VaR) fails to satisfy their axiom of sub-additivity. This implies that 
                                                 
7 Merton and Perold (1993) emphasize this point, arguing that performance measurement in 
financial institutions is different from industrial companies because their customers are their 
largest liability holders and as a consequence, a high credit rating is generally essential to maintain 
their business activities, eg as dealers or customers in OTC markets, to underwrite securities or to 
compete effectively in the corporate banking and deposit markets.  
11 
it is possible, when combining portfolios, that the overall VaR of the combined 
portfolio can be greater than the sum of the individual VaRs. This potential 
absence of diversification benefits has been interpreted to mean that VaR is an 
unsatisfactory risk measure and that alternative measures which do not violate the 
axiom of sub-additivity, eg expected tail shortfall, should be preferred instead. 
Our analysis leads to a slightly different interpretation of the Artzner et al (1999) 
results. We provide a further reason, in addition to the violation of sub-additivity, 
for thinking that VaR is a poor measure of risk for assessing risk-return trade-offs. 
So in this sense our work reinforces that of Artnzer et al. But our work also 
implies that VaR remains an acceptable risk measure for assessing the probability 
of default (in this application there is no compelling reason to impose the axiom 
of sub-additivity) and therefore may play a role in a two-factor pricing model such 
as that suggested by Froot and Stein (1998). 
  Another paper close to our own is Crouhy et al (1999). They note that that 
RAROC does not measure NPV, when NPV is measured according the CAPM 
and there is a single RAROC hurdle rate. However they restrict their analysis to 
the comparison of arithmetic and log-normally distributed returns and do so 
without reference to underlying asset pricing theory. We provide a fuller 
discussion of the underlying economic intuition and extend the quantitative 
comparisons to defaultable debt, revealing much larger differences in RAROC 
hurdles than they report.
8 Our work and that of Crouhy et al (1999) can usefully 
be contrasted with the analysis of RAROC and economic capital provided by 
Jokiuvuolle (2006), who also assumes CAPM valuation but under the alternative 
assumption that returns are multivariate normally distributed. 
 
 
3  RAROC and financial valuation 
This section discusses the relationship between RAROC and the standard theory 
of financial valuation. 
 
 
3.1  Notation and assumptions 
A financial institution considers an investment in an exposure indexed by i held 
for a single period with an initial funding cost of Li(0).
9 The exposure can be one 
of many different kinds, including a loan, a trading position, an off balance sheet 
commitment, or an insurance contract. It can be a portfolio of assets as well as a 
                                                 
8 Milne and Onorato (2009) provide a more formal discussion of the underlying theory. 
9 Throughout this section we distinguish the timing of cash flows and payoffs, using (0) to indicate 
the beginning of the period and (1) the end of the period.  
12 
single asset. Li(0) can be positive or negative (for example writing an option 
creates a positive cash flow at the time of the contract, in which case Li(0) is 
negative). At the end of the period this exposure realises a payoff of Ri(1) + Ai(1) 
with an expected value of Ri(1) ie Ai(1) measures the distribution of end-period 
payoffs about their mean value with E[Ai(1)] = 0. 
  In order to discuss balance sheet diversification we must also pay attention to 
the distribution of returns on the remainder of the institution’s portfolio. Payoffs 
on the remainder of the portfolio are denoted by  ) 1 ( A ) 1 ( R i i + , and on the total 
portfolio including Ai by  ) 1 ( A ) 1 ( A ) 1 ( R ) 1 ( R ) 1 ( A ) 1 ( R i i i i + + + = + . The upper 
case for the expected payoffs Ri(0),  ) 0 ( Ri , and R(0) indicates that these are all 
absolute nominal monetary payoffs, not rates of return which we will distinguish 
using lower case eg r. 
  The distribution of total portfolio payoffs are described by the cumulative 
density function (CDF) denoted by a double HH to indicate this is a multivariate 
distribution  ) X ) 1 ( A , X ) 1 ( A ( p ) X X ( HH i i i i i i ≤ ≤ = . From HH we can derive 
various single variable distributions which are of interest for risk measurement 
purposes: 
 
1.  the total portfolio CDF denoted as  ) X ) 1 ( A ) 1 ( A ) 1 ( A ( p ) X ( H i i ≤ + = = ; 
2.  the stand alone CDF denoted as Hi(Xi) = p(Ai(1) ≤ Xi); and 
3.  the total portfolio CDF without the investment i denoted as 
) X ) 1 ( A ( p ) X ( H i i i i ≤ = . 
 
All these distributions have zero expectations, since they describe payoffs relative 
to their expected values. Otherwise we place no restrictions on these distributions. 
  Risk capital is measured using the quantiles of the CDF at a chosen 
probability threshold p*. Thus the total portfolio risk capital is given by   
–HH




10 Typically, since p* is small, H
–1(p*) is negative and much greater in 
absolute magnitude than expected net return, so risk capital is positive. We can 
also allow for diversification at portfolio level by measuring risk capital as 
*) p ( H *) p ( H
1 1
i
− − − . We define return on risk capital or RAROC for exposure i in 




*) p ( H
) 0 ( L r ) 1 ( R
r 1
i
i f i rc
i − −
−
=  (3.1) 
 
                                                 
10 Note that under this definition risk capital is a VaR type quantile risk measure associated with 
period 1 return distribution and therefore differs from equity capital which is a period 0 source of 
funding.  
13 
or as a portfolio measure 
 
*) p ( H *) p ( H
) 0 ( L r ) 1 ( R
r 1 1
i
i f i prc
i − − −
−
=  (3.2) 
 
The difference between the two is that in the second portfolio measure the 
numerator is the ‘marginal’ contribution to institution wide portfolio risk ie the 
difference between aggregate portfolio VaR with and without exposure i. 
  In the remainder of the paper we will consider only the stand alone measure. 
This is not because the portfolio measure is unimportant for risk management 
decisions, but because as discussed in the following sub-section the standard 
theory of financial valuation depends only on the market pricing kernel. Thus, a 
point often forgotten by practitioners, in order to measure value created for 
investors the benefits of diversification need to be assessed at the level of the 
aggregate economy and largely depend on the contribution to aggregate investor 
portfolio risk exposure not to firm portfolio risk exposure. 
 
 
3.2  Asset pricing theory and market valuation 
We denote the time t = 0 market value of exposure i by  ) 0 ( A ˆ
i .
11 In this subsection 
we outline the standard asset pricing theory that we use to model this market value 
) 0 ( A ˆ
i .
12 Under the assumption that all risks are tradable in liquid markets the 
market value of exposure i can be expressed as
13 
 
)] 1 ( zA [ E ) 1 ( R ] z [ E ))] 1 ( A ) 1 ( R ( z [ E ) 0 ( A ˆ
i i i i i + = + =  (3.3) 
 
where z is a pricing (or stochastic discount) factor. The market rate of return on 
asset i is defined as 
 
) 0 ( A ˆ




i =  (3.4) 
 
                                                 
11 We use a ‘hat’ to distinguish market measures (eg Âi) from the corresponding accounting 
measure (the accounting valuation of the exposure measured at cost would be Ai = Li. We use the 
same ‘hat’ for the zero-NPV RAROC, since this is the return on capital achieved by an exposure 
with a market value Âi(0) that equals its accounting value measured on a cost of acquisition basis 
Li(0). 
12 This theory is described in many textbooks. Our presentation follows that in part I of Cochrane 
(2005). 
13 This is Cochrane (2005), equation 1.4, with our slightly amended notation.  
14 
Note that in the case of a risk free asset  ) 1 ( R ] z [ E ) 0 ( A ˆ
i i = , implying that 
[] () () ( )
1
f i i r 1 1 R / 0 A ˆ z E
− + = = .
14 
  We will further assume that markets are complete.
15 z is then unique and 
represents the marginal valuations by investors of all possible asset returns.
16 The 
content of this theory comes from the fact that z is the same for all assets. This 
theory supports a number of widely standard results about asset pricing. Investors 
do not need to be compensated for risks that can be diversified through trading of 
risky investment instruments. Compensation is required only for risks that are 
correlated with the investor valuation of returns (those that co-vary with z). 
Portfolio or exposure-specific characteristics will not affect valuations. 
  This theory can be represented in many equivalent ways. We will use the 
following ‘security line representation’ expressing the correlation of returns 
between  ()
() 0 A ˆ
1 A
i
i  and z in terms of ρiz, and the standard deviation of  ()
() 0 A ˆ
1 A
i
i  in terms 
of σi 
 
z i iz f i r r σ σ ρ − =  (3.5) 
 
This shows that excess returns  ) r r ( f i −  are linear function of both correlation of 
returns with z and of the standard deviation of returns. The z are not directly 
observed. They are a set of relative valuations inferred from the prices of 
investment assets. However given further assumptions about either investor 
preferences, or the determinants and distribution of investor returns, z can be 
modeled using observable economic or market factors, yielding a number of 
standard asset pricing equations, including the standard CAPM. 
 
 
                                                 
14 A different expression applies in the situation where there are no risk free assets and hence no 
risk-free interest rate r. 
15 Our main results still obtain under the weaker assumption that all assets are traded in liquid 
markets (absence of arbitrage opportunities). Suppose first that we are considering the RAROC 
hurdle for an asset that is ‘spanned’ by all existing traded assets. In this case, while there is no 
unique stochastic discount factor z, market prices are still uniquely determined and our 
propositions continue to hold. If the financial asset is not so spanned then no unique RAROC 
hurdle exists and so RAROC certainly cannot be used for performance measurement. In this case 
there is instead a minimum hurdle below which an exposure is definitely value destroying for all 
investors. 
16 The ratio of z
a and z
b for two different outcomes 
a
i A  and 
b
i A  represents the willingness of 
investors to exchange a small increase in return in the event of outcome 
a
i A  for a small decrease 
in return in the event of outcome 
b
i A .  
15 
3.3  Defining the right hurdle rate: the zero-NPV RAROC 
This sub-section defines the appropriate hurdle rate when using RAROC 
rc
i r 
(return on risk capital) as a performance measure to measure value creation. As 
explained in section 3.1, RAROC can be written 
 
*) p ( H
) 0 ( L r ) 1 ( R
r 1
i
i f i rc
i − −
−
=  (3.6) 
 
We first obtain the zero-NPV RAROC hurdle rate. Net present value or NPV is 
the difference between the market value of an exposure  ) 0 ( A ˆ
i  and its cost of 
acquisition Li(0) and can therefore be written as
17 
 
) 0 ( L ) 0 ( A ˆ NPV i i − =  (3.7) 
 
This is a net present value because it is the present discounted value of future 
returns less the current cost of acquisition of the exposure. Exposures are value 
creating and should be acquired if and only if NPV > 0. The stand alone return on 
risk capital on a zero-NPV exposure (one where  ) 0 ( L ) 0 ( A ˆ
i i = ) can then be 
written as the following ratio 
 
*) p ( H




i f i rc
i − −
−
=  (3.8) 
 
Equation (3.8) is the zero-NPV RAROC hurdle rate. An alternative and equivalent 




i r ˆ r >  ie 
rc
i r ˆ  is 
the required rate of return on risk capital or zero-NPV RAROC hurdle rate. 
  We now examine the determinants of this zero-NPV RAROC hurdle rate, 
showing that an increase in skewness increases risk capital relative to required 
returns and so reduces 
rc
i r ˆ . By substituting equation (3.4) and (3.5) into (3.8) we 
can rewrite this zero-NPV hurdle rate as 
 
*) p ( H




z i z , i i rc
i − −
σ σ ρ
=  (3.9) 
 
                                                 
17 This is the NPV formula in a single-period setting. Multi-period NPV formulations are obtained 
from the valuation of an asset traded at period 0 offering period t future expected payoffs 
Ri(t) + Ai(t) where Ri(t) is the known expected return and Ai(t) is the distribution around that 
return for t = 1,2,…,T.  
16 
This shows that it is legitimate to use RAROC with single institution-wide hurdle 
rate for all exposures i = 1,2,...,I only if the required return premium for each 
exposure (the numerator of equation (3.9) is proportional to the risk capital (the 
denominator of this equation). The conditions for this to be true are demanding. In 
particular an increase skewness raises the VaR denonominator  *) p ( H
1
i
−  by more 
than it increases  i z , i i ) 0 ( A ˆ σ ρ  and so lowers the zero-NPV hurdle rate. 
  A sufficient condition for the return on standalone risk capital to be the same 
for all exposures is that for any given i the distribution of i can be expressed as a 
mean-preserving spread of a single underlying asset return distribution A
+(1) ie 
that the skewness and higher moments of all distributions are the same.
18 In this 
case ρi,z and is the same for all assets and H(A
i(1)) is proportional to σi so 
rc
i r ˆ  is 
the same for all assets. An example where this is the case is when all asset returns 
obey a multivariate normal distribution. This is not a necessary condition because 
it is just possible that differences is ρi between assets are exactly offset by 
differences in the ratio of H(A
i(1)) to σi; but this is an implausible situation. It is 
clear that zero-NPV RAROC hurdles can vary considerably, depending upon the 
shape of the return distribution. 
 
 
4  Calculations of zero-NPV RAROC hurdles 
This section presents some illustrative calculations of the RAROC hurdle rate, the 
return on risk capital that must be achieved by an NPV positive investment either 
in equities or in debt portfolios of varying credit qualities and discusses the 
practical implications of our analysis. Variations in these hurdle rates from one 
exposure to another are not just a theoretical issue. Our calculations suggest that 
the differences in these hurdle rates are large enough to be of considerable 
practical concern and that using a single institution-wide RAROC measure leads 
to substantial misvaluation of investment opportunities. 
  In order to conduct these calculations we making some specific but plausible 
assumptions about the distribution of returns on different assets (equity and 
various qualities of debt) at the end of a fixed holding period.
19 These assumptions 
determine both the distribution of asset returns and, most importantly, the 
relationship between these returns and aggregate market returns. 
  We then apply the standard asset pricing tools described in the previous 
section to calculate the expected market return on each investment. We do this by 
value each portfolio (its ‘present value’) and calculating its correlation with the 
                                                 
18 For a formal proof of this statement see Milne and Onorato (2009). 
19 It would be possible to extend to the case of multiple periods of investment and consumption, 
rather than a single holding period, but this is not necessary to our argument.  
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‘pricing kernel’. Most of our calculations assume quadratic investor preferences 
so the pricing kernel is then that of the standard CAPM, a negative linear function 
of the market return, but we also consider the case of constant relative risk 
aversion, with the pricing kernel is proportional to the marginal utility of a 
representative investor. 
  Finally we compute the amount of risk capital that has to be held against each 
asset in order to maintain the probability of default to a given threshold ie we 
calculate its value at risk. Combining these results allows us to compute the 
RAROC hurdle rate on each investment (this is the ratio of the required expected 
market return, less the cost of financing the purchase of the asset, to risk capital). 
  Our calculations make the following assumptions: 
 
•  The investment horizon and also maturity of debt securities are one year 
(having these time periods the same means that there is no interest rate risk.) 
•  For Tables 4.1–4.3 we assume that all investors have quadratic preferences, 
the required returns on both equity and debt are calculated using the capital 
asset pricing model. For our baseline illustrations we assume rf = 5%  and 
rm = 11% and σm = 10%. 
•  Our use of the CAPM is different from that in the usual MBA level textbooks, 
because returns are not normally distributed. The end period value of the 
equity portfolio is instead log-normally distributed given by: 
) 0 ( A ˆ ) sZ q exp( ) 1 ( A ) 1 ( R i i i + = +  where q and s are the log (or instantaneous) 
rate of return and standard deviation and  ) 0 ( A ˆ
i  is the period 0 market value 
of the equity portfolio. Z is the underlying portfolio risk factor with a standard 
normal distribution. 
•  The market portfolio is assumed to be that offered by the equity portfolio (the 
equity portfolio is fully diversified). Hence for the equity portfolio σi = σm 
and ri = rm and we can use these relationships to obtain expressions for both q 
and s in terms of σm and rm (see appendix for these and other technical details 
and supporting Mathematica notebook for calculations). 
•  Tables 4.4 and 4.5 assume a representative investor with constant relative risk 
aversion ie with expected utility given by  γ − φ +
γ − dZ ) 1 /( ) Z ( )] sZ q [exp(
1  
hence placing a marginal valuation on returns for given Z of 
γ − + )] sZ q [exp( . 
Here γ is the investors’ coefficient of relative risk aversion and this can itself 
be calculated from observable market rates of return. 
•  The returns on portfolios of defaultable debt are determined by the same 
aggregate factor Z as the equity portfolio, according to the single aggregate 
factor asymptotic Vasicek model (the standard model of credit portfolio 
returns used for the IRB calculations in the Basel II accord, see appendix for 
formal details). In our baseline LGD is the loss given default that we assume 
equal to 0.4; PD is the default probability, as reported in the third column of  
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Table 4.1, for the various debt classes; and ω = 0.4  is  the  correlation of 
underling asset values within the portfolio (ω
0.5 is the correlation of each asset 
with the market factor); and Z is the same aggregate risk factor that 
determines the returns on the equity portfolio. 
•  While our assumptions ensure analytical solutions for required return on 
equity, we have to use numerical integration to calculate the required returns 
on debt. 
 
We compare the equity portfolio with six different qualities of defaultable debt, 
ranging from A
− to CCC. The annual default probabilities PD are taken from the 
Fitch Ratings Global Corporate Finance Average Cumulative Default Rates 1990–
2007. Table 4.1 presents the resulting calculations of the zero-NPV RAROC 
hurdle rates. 
 
Table 4.1  Baseline CAPM Calculations of 


































Equity     10.00 1.00 11.00  29.80  20.14 
Debt A
–  0.10 0.22  0.37 5.05  4.90  0.95 
Debt  BBB  0.26 0.45  0.44 5.11  8.74  1.29 
Debt BB
+  0.69 0.90  0.53 5.27  14.62  1.86 
Debt  BB  1.24 1.36  0.59 5.46  19.05  2.40 
Debt B
+  1.44 1.52  0.61 5.52  20.27  2.57 
Debt  CCC 21.91 9.54  0.92 9.38  35.73  12.25 
Notes: The risk free rate of interest is rf = 5%. In the case of the equity portfolio column (4), (5) and (6) are 
all determined by the assumption that equity returns match those on the market as a whole, with a market 
return of rm  =  11% and standard deviation of σm  =  10%. In the case of debt Column (3) is an assumed 
parameter and the standard deviation and market return shown in columns (4) and (5) are calculated from the 
assumed Vasicek return distribution with asset correlation R = 0.4 and LGD = 0.4. Column (6) is the required 
return calculated according to the CAPM from (4) and (5) using rf + ρi,mσi*(rm – rf)/σm. Risk capital in 
column (7) is calculated as the difference between the mean expected return and the 99.97% left hand tail of 
the assumed return distribution. Columns (3), (4), (6) and (7) are all percentages of the beginning of period 
market value of the exposure. 
 
 
The standard deviation, and correlation and required return on the equity portfolio 
(columns (4), (5) and (6)) are determined by our assumption that equity portfolio 
returns correspond exactly to those for the market portfolio as a whole. The 
corresponding standard deviation and correlation with the market for the debt 
portfolios are calculated from equation (11) using numerical integration. Column 
(6) is the CAPM required return. The risk capital in column (7) is  *) p ( H
1
i
− −  
calculated using the default probability threshold p* = 99.97%. This threshold is a 
common industry choice for credit and value at risk calculations at a one year  
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horizon. Finally the RAROC hurdle is the required risk premium (the required 
return less the risk free rate) as a percentage of risk capital. 
  Note that the standard deviation of returns on debt (column (4)) are much 
smaller, as a percentage of market value, than those on equity. Investment grade 
debt has especially low volatility of returns (recall this is short term one year debt 
so there is no interest rate risk over a one year holding horizon) and even the 
speculative grade (B
+ and BB) has much less volatility than equity. Only the debt 
in immediate risk of default (CCC) has a volatility of returns close to that of 
equity. 
  Correlations of debt returns with the market (column (5)) are also somewhat 
smaller than for equity, especially for the higher grades of debt. This is a plausible 
feature of the Vasicek model that underlies these calculations, since there is a very 
non-linear relationship between aggregate market returns and default. Small 
deviations in market returns about their expected level have only a minor impact 
on default rates, but a large decline in market returns is associated with a 
proportionately bigger rise in default and credit losses. Therefore correlation is 
less than one to one, even when the same aggregate risk factor drives both market 
returns and corporate debt default. 
  The relatively low standard deviation of returns and correlation with the 
market mean that the required returns on debt (column (6)) are also comparatively 
low. They are of course still at a positive premium to the risk free rate of 5%, 
because returns all increase with the same underlying risk factor. But on one-year 
A
− debt the required return premium is only 5 basis points. The observed market 
risk premium on such debt is in practice likely to be higher than such a theoretical 
calculation because of liquidity and other market frictions; none the less it is quite 
appropriate that it should be far less than the risk premium on equity. Even for B
+ 
debt the risk premium we calculate is only 46 basis points, again much lower than 
the assumed 6% on equity. Again this is one year debt so such a risk premium is 
not implausible. Only the distressed CCC debt, on the verge of default, has a risk 
premium similar to that of equity. 
  The key finding of this table then appears in column (7). The zero-NPV 
RAROC hurdle represents the level of RAROC on a marginal investment 
opportunity. Any investment earning a superior RAROC than that shown in 
column (7) creates value for the investor. This zero-NPV RAROC hurdle varies 
hugely and is very much lower for most categories of debt than for equity. The 
RAROC hurdle for debt rated B
+ or above is between one eighth and one 
twentieth of that for equity exposures. This is a very large difference indeed. Even 
for the distressed CCC debt, which is in many ways similar to equity, the zero-
NPV RAROC hurdle is somewhat smaller than on equity, a consequence of the 
large amount of required risk capital. 
  Why this large difference in required returns on risk capital? As discussed 
above in relation to equation (3.9) the RAROC hurdle depends on the skewness of  
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return distributions. The RAROC hurdle for debt is much lower than that for 
equity, because of the right-skew of our assumed log-normal returns on equity and 
the left-skew of our assumed Vasicek credit portfolio returns on debt. These are 
standard models of the returns on equity and debt. They can be criticized as not 
providing the best possible fit to data. But still, even if other models are preferred, 
those will still share same skewness properties of these distributions, with a 
pronounced left-skew on debt returns and a more modest right skew on equity and 
thus yield RAROC hurdles for debt much lower than on equity. 
  It follows that when making a leveraged investment in debt, investors should 
be willing to accept a much lower return on capital than when investing in a 
leveraged equity portfolio. This is because, while they must hold a relatively large 
amount of capital that must be held against debt exposures as protection against 
comparatively rare extreme events (in Table 4.1 this is assumed to be equivalent 
to a loss of capital one in every three-thousand years), this is comparatively safe 
capital. In all but the very worst years debt investments will almost all be fully 
repaid and so the return on capital, in most years, is very predictable. In contrast 
when making a leveraged investment in equity, relative to the amount of capital 
needed as protection against the same extreme events, the return is relatively 
uncertain, even a modestly bad outcome can result in losses. 
  Debt, even below investment grade, is normally fairly safe (the standard 
deviation of column (6) and the required risk capital of column (7) are 
considerably smaller when compared those on an equity portfolio with the same 
market value); but when losses do occur they are comparatively large. As a result 
it is necessary to hold a relatively large amount of risk capital for these debt 
exposures, in comparison to the required excess of return over and above the safe 
rate of interest. And therefore the return on risk-capital is very much smaller than 
on equity. 
  Table 4.1 illustrate that RAROC hurdles for debt portfolios can be 
quantitatively very much smaller than for equity investments. This reported 
difference has been obtained for very specific choices of investor utility and 
market return parameters. Tables 4.2–4.4 explore the most material variations of 
this baseline specification. 
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Table 4.2  Alternative calculations, varying risk-capital 
     default  threshold 
 
     baseline: 
p* = 99.97% 
p* = 99.8%  p* = 98%  p* = 90% 
























Equity     29.80  20.14 25.65  23.39 21.31  28.15 15.65  38.35 
Debt A
–  0.10 4.90  0.95 2.08  2.24 0.39  11.87 0.03  178.02 
Debt  BBB  0.26 8.74  1.29 4.28  2.63 1.02  11.07 0.11  102.22 
Debt BB
+  0.69  14.62  1.86 8.30  3.27 2.52  10.80 0.40  67.21 
Debt  BB  1.24 19.05  2.40 11.85  3.85  4.18  10.92  0.83  54.79 
Debt B
+  1.44 20.27  2.57 12.90  4.03  4.74  10.99  1.00  52.25 
Debt CCC  21.91  35.73  12.25 33.20  13.18 25.48 17.17  14.34 30.51 
Note: Calculations the same as for columns (7) and (8) of Table 1. 
 
 
Table 4.2, compares the baseline calculations of Table 4.1 (repeated in the fourth 
and fifth columns) with three other sets of calculations, each with a successively 
less extreme default threshold for the calculation of risk capital. Thus we move 
from one in three thousand years (the Table 4.1 baseline p = 99.97) to one in five 
hundred years (p  =  99.8%), one in fifty years (p  =  98%) and one in ten years 
(p = 90%). Some financial institutions using capital allocation for assessing risk-
return decisions have chosen p  =  95% or p  =  90% rather than the extreme of 
p = 99.97 (there is considerable variation amongst firms in how capital allocation 
is actually put into practice). This means they have to use one default threshold 
when assessing their capital needs for protection against extreme outcomes and a 
different default threshold for assessing risk-return decisions and pricing loan and 
derivative products. But it has the advantage, illustrated in Table 4.2, of bringing 
the different RAROC hurdle rates more closely into line with each other. It is then 
easier to justify using a single hurdle rate for return on capital across an 
institution. 
  This correction does not eliminate the inconsistency between RAROC and 
standard valuation theory. As Table 4.2 illustrates, while the differences in 
RAROC hurdle rates at p = 99.8% and p = 98% are reduced, when compared with 
Table 4.1, they are far from eliminated. And when p  =  99% a new problem 
emerges. Now the RAROC hurdle rates for debt are very much higher than those 
on equity. The reason for this that the returns on debt, with their pronounced left-
hand skew, have correspondingly small but positive returns for the large majority 
of outcomes for the aggregate factor Z. As a result, as the probability threshold for 
measuring risk capital is reduced, the level of risk capital falls much more quickly 
for debt than for equity and eventually declines to zero even when Z is still 
negative (thus resulting in an unbounded threshold for return on capital). At some 
intermediate probability threshold, the RAROC hurdle rate may work out 
approximately the same for equity and for different categories of debt. But there is 
no means of determining this appropriate probability threshold without having  
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some independent measure of required returns, such as the one based on asset 
pricing theory applied in this paper. 
 
Table 4.3  Alternative calculations, 
      varying Vasicek asset correlation 
 
     ω = 0.6  Baseline: ω = 0.4  ω = 0.2  ω = 0.1 
























Equity     29.80  20.14 29.80  20.14 29.80  20.14 29.80  20.14 
Debt A
–  0.10  10.35 0.54  4.90 0.95  1.68 2.02  0.68 3.57 
Debt BBB  0.26  17.35 0.78 8.74  1.29 3.24 2.52  1.40 4.19 
Debt BB
+  0.69  25.97 1.26  14.62 1.86  6.03 3.25  2.80 5.03 
Debt BB 1.24  31.02 1.78  19.05 2.40  8.52 3.86  4.16 5.66 
Debt B
+  1.44  32.20 1.95  20.27 2.57  9.27 4.04  4.60 5.84 
Debt CCC  21.91  37.70  14.14 35.73  12.25 27.63 11.27  19.22 11.51 
Note: Calculations the same as for columns (7) and (8) of Table 4.1. 
 
 
Table 4.3 instead varies asset correlation, the key parameter of the Vasicek model 
of debt portfolio returns. The baseline figure of ω = 0.4 is a fairly typical of the 
values imposed in Basel II IRB risk calculations for corporate lending.
20 But by 
increasing this correlation to ω = 0.6 we can investigate the impact of increasing 
the sensitivity of loan default to aggregate risk; and by reducing this correlation 
we can obtain values more typical of retail lending of 0.2 or below. 
  Equity returns are unaffected by the asset correlation parameter determining 
debt default, so the entire equity row of Table 4.3 simply replicates the risk-
capital and RAROC hurdle rates from Table 4.1. Changing asset correlation has 
however a substantial impact on the risk capital that has to be set aside as 
protection on a leveraged investment in debt. Thus with ω = 0.6 the required risk 
capital (column (4)) is more than double that of the Table 4.1 baseline (column 
(6)), while with ω = 0.2 required risk capital (column (8)) falls to less than half 
that of the baseline. Increasing asset correlation also increases the correlation of 
debt returns with market returns, but this impact is relatively small. As a result the 
RAROC hurdle rate works out at close to the inverse of the required risk capital. 
Again this is consistent with equation (3.9) above. A higher asset correlation 
magnifies the left-hand skew of the Vasicek distribution of returns on debt and the 
more pronounced the left-hand skew the lower the required return on risk capital 
(the RAROC hurdle rate). 
  Other parameter changes are of less interest than those reported in Tables 4.2 
and 4.3. Changing the risk-free rate of interest (rf), the expected market return (rm) 
alters the CAPM required return per unit of portfolio standard deviation (recall 
                                                 
20 The Basel II IRB does not impose a single value for asset correlation. Instead it states ‘risk 
curves’ that specify how asset correlation varies along with probability of default and firm size. 
But these risk curves average out at close to 0.4 for corporate exposures and around 0.15 for retail 
lending.  
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this depends on (rm − rf)/σm); but this has the same impact on the returns required 
on both debt and on equity and so raises or lowers the RAROC hurdles by about 
the same amount. Their relative values are unaffected. The effect of altering σm is 
more complicated, a higher level of σm not only reduces the CAPM required 
returns per unit of portfolio standard deviation, it also alters the standard deviation 
and level of risk capital in equity portfolios and these changes increase the 
RAROC hurdle for equity relative to that on debt. But this impact is quantitatively 
small. Increasing LGD increases risk capital and required returns on debt but does 
not affect the RAROC hurdle. 
  The assumption of quadratic investor preferences underlying Tables 4.1–4.3 
conflicts with one of the basic rationales for measuring risk capital, the desire to 
avoid extreme losses. This suggests that alternative specifications of investor 
preferences, assuming relatively greater aversion to extreme losses, could reduce 
the gap between the RAROC hurdle rates for debt and for equity. Table 4.4 shows 
recalculations of the RAROC hurdle rates, assuming that instead of quadratic 
investor preferences there is a representative investor with constant relative risk 
aversion. In this case it is necessary to constrain investor preferences, for 
consistency with observable data and for the sake of comparability with Table 4.1. 
It turns out (see the technical appendix) that the coefficient of relative risk 
aversion (γ) of the representative investor can be easily calculated from the 
imposed values for risk-free rate of interest (rf), the expected market return (rm) 
and the volatility of market returns (σm) and this in turn allows calculations of the 
RAROC hurdle rates. 
  Required returns now depend on the covariance of investment returns with the 
marginal utility of the representative investor. Columns (4) and (5) report baseline 
results which can be directly compared with Table 4.1, making as they do exactly 
the same assumptions about the risk-free rate of interest (rf), the expected market 
return (rm) and the volatility of market returns (σm). Risk capital and expected 
returns on equity exactly as in Table 4.1 (recall that we assume that the equity 
portfolio is the same as the market portfolio). Expected returns on debt portfolios 
are now however higher than in Table 4.1 and the market values of debt portfolios 
correspondingly lower. As a result of the assumption of a representative investor 
with constant relative risk aversion, the RAROC hurdle for A
− debt slightly more 
than doubles from 0.95 to 2.09. The impact becomes somewhat smaller as debt 
ratings decline. For the equity like CCC debt there is only a small increase. 
Despite this, the RAROC hurdle for all debt portfolios (except CCC) remains 
substantially below the hurdle rate for equity portfolios. 
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Table 4.4  Representative Investor with Constant Relative 
     Risk  Aversion 
 
     Baseline:  rf = 5%, 
rm = 11%, σm = 10% 
rm = 14%  σm = 5% 
Relative risk aversion:  γ = 7.23  γ = 15.70  γ = 45.00 












Equity     11.00  20.14 14.00  30.09 11.00  37.53 
Debt A
– 0.10 5.10  2.09 5.22  4.54 5.40  8.23 
Debt BBB  0.26 5.23  2.60 5.47 5.40  5.82 9.36 
Debt BB
+  0.69 5.50  3.44 6.00  6.78 6.65  11.17 
Debt BB 1.24 5.80  4.18 6.53 7.97  7.47  12.73 
Debt B
+ 1.44 5.90  4.41 6.71  8.34 7.73  13.19 
Debt CCC  21.91  10.29  14.67  13.43 22.75  16.39 29.97 
Notes: Risk capital for both debt and equity is computed as in Table 4.1. As in Table 4.1, equity returns are 
assumed equal to market returns, so that the expected return on equity equals rm, yielding the RAROC hurdle 
for equity. The required return on debt depends on the coefficient of relative risk aversion of the 
representative investor. This is calculated from rf, rm and σm (see appendix for details) and allows a 
calculation of the covariance between debt returns and the marginal utility of consumption of the aggregate 
investors, in turn yielding the required return on debt. 
 
 
With a representative investor with constant relative risk aversion it is no longer 
the case that changes in the expected market return (rm) or the volatility of market 
returns (σm) have a similar impact on the RAROC hurdles for both debt and 
equity, leaving their relative values largely unchanged. The reason, illustrated in 
columns (6)–(9) of Table 4.4, is that raising rm or lowering σm substantially 
increases the coefficient of relative risk aversion of the representative investor (γ). 
This increases the valuation placed by the representative investor on returns when 
aggregate output and consumption are comparatively low and marginal utility is 
high, in turn increases the required return on debt and raises the RAROC hurdle 
for debt relative to that for equity. Nevertheless, even when the coefficient of 
relative risk aversion rises to the very high level of 45, the RAROC hurdle on 
equity remains about four times those on almost all categories of debt.
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  We complete this section with a brief discussion of some practical issues. 
What are the potential losses to shareholders if a financial institution mistakenly 
imposes a hurdle rate, appropriate for equity, on debt investments? Since equity 
capital cannot be easily increased to take advantage of investment opportunities, 
how can a financial institution sensibly ration its available equity capital amongst 
competing opportunities? 
  We address these questions using the further calculations reported in Table 
4.5. This table investigates how shareholder value added, available when a bank 
make loans with a fundamental value (in our notation  ) 0 ( A ˆ ) greater than cost (in 
our notation L(0)), affects risk capital and RAROC. The successive rows of Table 
4.5 report risk capital and RAROC for increasingly profitable lending 
                                                 
21 As demonstrated in the Mathematica notebook supporting this paper, reducing rf  also increases 
γ and thus increases the RAROC hurdles for debt relative to that for equity.  
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opportunities, with a cost (relative to fundamental value) ranging from 100% 
down to 95%. A loan in the first row – one that costs 100% of its the present 
discounted value of future cash flows – creates no value for shareholders. A loan 
represented on the second row, one that costs 99% of its fundamental value, 
creates a new value (or in the terminology of the CAPM an ‘alpha’) of 1% of the 
fundamental value for shareholders. By the bottom row we have reached highly 
profitable lending opportunities creating an ‘alpha’ of 5%. 
 
Table 4.5  Assessment of loan decisions 
 
Cost as % of 
fundamental 
value 
BB debt, default probability 0.26% 
RAROC hurdle: 2.60 
BBB debt default probability 1.24% 














100.0  8.75 2.60 0.00  19.12 4.18 0.00 
99.00  7.70 15.59 12.99  18.07  9.71  5.54 
98.00  6.65 32.69 30.08  17.02 15.93 11.75 
97.00  5.60 56.19 53.59  15.97 22.97 18.79 
96.00  4.55 90.54 87.94  14.92 31.00 26.82 
95.00 3.50 145.52 142.92  13.87  40.24  36.06 
Notes. Uses the baseline assumptions of Table 4.4, so p  =  99.97%, all loans are one year, and rf = 5%, 
rm = 11%, σm = 10% together implying a coefficient of relative risk aversion γ = 7.23. The RAROC hurdle is 
that of Table 4.4, column 5. 
 
 
The columns of Table 4.5 reports risk capital and RAROC hurdles for two 
categories of debt, selected from the earlier tables, for BB debt with an average 
annual default probability of 0.26% and for BBB debt with an annual average 
default probability of 1.24%. Risk capital and the RAROC hurdle rate are 
calculated using the assumptions of the baseline in Table 4.4, ie with a 
representative investor with constant relative risk aversion and with the baseline 
assumptions of Table 4.1 for the risk free rate of interest, and the expected level 
and volatility of market returns. Columns 2 and 5 report the level of risk capital, 
expressed as a proportion of fundamental value, for the two categories of debt. 
These fall as lending opportunities become more profitable. This is simply 
because the surplus available on these one year loans (the increasing interest 
margin) provides an additional margin of protection against default and so less 
capital is needed. 
  Columns 3 and 6 report the RAROC achieved from these different lending 
opportunities. For loans in the first row that do not create value, RAROC equals 
the RAROC hurdle from Table 4.4. The achieved RAORC then rises rapidly as 
fundamental value increases, because the RAROC denominator risk capital falls 
and the RAROC numerator, expected return less the cost of funding, rises. 
Columns 4 and 7 report the surplus RAROC, over and above the hurdle rate. The 
level of risk capital times the surplus RAROC equals the economic value added or  
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EVA created for shareholders and this in turns equals the difference between the 
fundamental value and the cost of the loan. 
  Suppose now that a bank operates its lending business with an institution wide 
RAROC hurdle of 20% (ie the RAROC hurdle for equity from the baseline of 
Table 4.4.) This bank will refuse one year BB loans with an profit margin (net of 
all costs including risk) of 1%, because the achieved RAROC (Table 4.5, column 
3 ,  l i n e  2 )  i s  o n l y  j u s t  o v e r  1 5 % .  I n  t h e  c a s e  o f  B B B  l o a n s  i t  w i l l  r e f u s e  
opportunities with a profit margins as high as 2% (column 6). These lending 
opportunities are all valuable opportunities for shareholders that could easily be 
passed over by applying a single institution wide RAROC hurdle. 
  Suppose instead that the bank uses, as our analysis indicates it should, 
different RAROC hurdle rates for different categories of exposure, using the 
hurdle rates calculated from the baseline of Table 4.4. In this case it will wish to 
accept a much wider range of lending opportunities. But this creates a new 
problem: that of ensuring that it has sufficient capital to survive a situation when 
returns on lending and investments are poor. Suppose the bank wishes to reduce 
the probability of losing all its capital, and ending up in financial distress, to the 
0.03% per annum, ie it makes the conservative choice of p = 99.97% used in our 
baseline calculations. One way to proceed would be to persuade shareholders that 
it does indeed have many profitable lending opportunities of the kinds illustrated 
in Table 4.5. It could then raise sufficient capital to reduce the probability of 
financial distress to its desired level. But what if, as is likely, shareholders are not 
persuaded that these opportunities are real and will not provide the necessary 
capital. Then the bank must ration its capital across all available lending 
opportunities. 
  An effective way to do this is to set an institution wide target for surplus 
RAROC, the RAROC over and above the RAROC hurdle, as illustrated in Table 
4.5, columns 4 and 7. This target level has then to be set at the positive level 
where the institution is employing all its available capital. If capital remains 
unused when the surplus RAROC equals zero, then there is an opportunity to 
return capital to shareholders. 
  What calculations of the kind shown in Table 4.5 achieve is a ranking of all 
investment opportunities. The bank should begin first with the opportunities 
offering the highest surplus RAROC and only then subsequently move onto those 
with the lower surplus RAROC. This yields to very different portfolio choices 
than when applying a single institution wide RAROC hurdle. Consider for 
example a surplus RAROC hurdle of 15%. A casual look at Table 4.5 might 
suggest that this leads to the same lending decisions as using a single institution 
wide RAROC hurdle rate of 20% ie the RAROC hurdle derived from equity 
investments, since once again the 1% profit margin BB and the 2% profit margin 
BBB lending opportunities are turned down. But this is not the case. Now, if the 
same surpus RAROC criteria is applied to equity investments as well as to debt  
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then these, in order to achieve a surplus RAROC of 15%, must provide an annual 
return on capital of 35% or more. So the likely consequence is a reduction of 
equity investments and a re-allocation of capital to lending (given that this bank 
has highly profitable lending opportunities). 
  Provided there is then capital to spare, released by a withdrawal from equity 
investments, then the surplus RAROC hurdle can be reduced, to say 10%, 
allowing the financial institution characterized by Table 4.5 to take up the 
additional 1% profit margin BB and 2% profit margin BBB lending opportunities. 
If further capital remains unallocated then the surplus RAROC hurdle can be 
reduce further, to 8% and 6% and so on. Formally we can rewrite equation (3.9) 
for the required hurdle rate as the following two factor relationship 
 
s
*) p ( H








= −  (4.1) 
 
in which required return on risk capital are corrected separately both the 
systematic risk (ρi,zσiσz) and also for balance sheet constraints (s). 
  This approach also resolves one of the main practical problems when 
conducting capital allocation using a single institution wide hurdle rate. Even 
though RAROC is widely used, financial institutions have no process for 
establishing the level of the RAROC hurdle and set it at arbitrary levels. The 
process of rationing available capital to the highest surplus RAROC opportunities 
resolves this problem, because the surplus RAROC hurdle emerges naturally as 
the ‘shadow price’ s for the limited available equity. This is not a market price, 
rather it is adjusted up and down to the level at which all capital is being utlised 
and supporting those investments yielding the highest possible surplus over the 
minimum required RAROC. If however this shadow price falls to zero, then 




5 Concluding  remarks 
This paper has examined the common industry measure return on risk capital ie 
RAROC and its use as a performance measure. In all realistic situations the hurdle 
rate for zero-value investments, the required return on risk capital, must be 
adjusted on an exposure-specific basis. Such an adjustment is needed in order to 
correct for differences in skewness and vary substantially from one exposure to 
another (as illustrated by the very different RAROC hurdles reported in Tables 
4.1–4.4 for equity and different rating classes of debt).  
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  The rationale for these results is both standard and once understood fairly 
obvious. In the frictionless setting of standard asset pricing theory, investors need 
compensation only for systematic risk (correlation of returns with the investor’s 
marginal valuation of aggregate returns). All other risk can be diversified away. 
Exposures with relative large left-hand tails should therefore be subject to 
relatively low RAROC hurdles. 
  There is room for refinement of our quantitative results, using more detailed 
market and financial institution data and alternative return distributions. Such 
further analysis could alter the discrepancies between RAROC hurdle rates either 
up or down. We could use models of equity returns that have larger left hand tails 
and thus lower the RAROC discrepancies. At the same time the Vasicek debt 
portfolio model we use is far from perfect and the most obvious developments of 
that model, for example allowing for correlation between LGD and aggregate 
economic conditions, would increase the left hand tail of debt returns and increase 
the RAROC discrepancy. We could allow for less than complete correlation 
between the risk factor diving portfolio returns and the aggregate market and we 
could allow aggregate returns to incorporate returns on debt. Nonetheless, even 
without conducting, further research it is clear that the discrepancies we report are 
not accidental. They are quantitatively large and caused by fundamental 
differences in the shape of return distributions. 
  Another topic that merits further research would be to correct these RAROC 
hurdles to allow for potential systemic interactions, such as those which have 
undermined financial institution balance sheets in the current global financial 
crisis. Systemic events, which are not captured by the simple Vasicek portfolio 
model applied here, induce exceptionally large left hand tails in return 
distributions and should therefore be taken into account in determining the level 
and return on capital in financial institutions. 
  The usual current practice in the industry, applying a single institution-wide 
RAROC hurdle, entirely ignores the substantial differences in zero-NPV RAROC 
hurdles reported here. As illustrated by Table 4.5, this can lead to potentially 
severe misallocation of capital ie to the failure to take up lending and investment 
opportunities that create substantial shareholder value. 
  Our analysis leads to a simple procedure for correcting this shortcoming, 
based on our equation (3.8). Risk managers should estimate the covariance 
between individual investment returns and aggregate market returns. This 
covariance, preferably adjusted as in Table 4.4 to allow for investor preferences 
that value marginal returns relatively highly when aggregate returns are poor, 
yields exposure specific RAROC hurdles. Using these, rather than a single 
institution wide hurdle rate, can help institutions do a much better job of 
identifying investment opportunities that create value for shareholders. If equity 
capital, as it usually will be, is in short supply then they can use a second risk 
measure, the surplus of RAROC above the exposure specific hurdle, to ration  
29 
equity capital amongst different value creating opportunities. In this way, as 
earlier recommended by Froot and Stein (1998), financial institutions are able to 
price separately for systematic risk and balance sheet constraints. 
  Our findings should be of interest not just to the shareholders and 
management of financial institutions but also to debt holders and to financial 
regulators, those ‘stakeholders’ with a particular interest in ensuring that there is a 
low risk of financial institution default or distress. Distinguishing between the 
pricing of systematic market wide risk and institution specific balance sheet 
constraints seems to be essential, if financial institutions are to appropriately 
manage their activities from the perspective of debt and deposit holders, and of 
broader financial system stability, as well as from the narrower perspective of 
shareholder value creation. 
  Using single institution-wide RAROC hurdle rates has exaggerated the 
shareholder benefits of leverage has encouraged banks and other financial 
institutions to repay too much capital to shareholders and acquire excessive debt. 
This has been one reason for the excess leverage that has contributed to the global 
financial crisis of the past two years. Using exposure-specific RAROC hurdle 
rates incorporating systematic risk, and pricing separately for balance sheet 
constraints, removes this unnecessary conflict. Debt holders and regulators prefer 
the bank to be safe from the risk of default, ie to make a relatively conservative 
choice of the threshold for the calculation of the risk capital in the RAROC 
denominator and hence operate the institution with relatively low leverage. A 
more conservative choice of threshold (a higher p*), while it increases the capital 
allocated to each exposure, also lowers the zero-NPV RAROC hurdle, the 
exposure specific return required to compensate shareholders for systematic risk. 
But the value creating exposures available to the bank are exactly the same, 
whether it is run aggressively with high leverage or conservatively with low 
leverage. Hence institutions run with higher capital do not necessarily end up 
creating less shareholder value. 
  The conflict between shareholders and debt holders is not entirely removed. 
Shareholders do not always trust financial institution management as stewards of 
their money. They are therefore reluctant to provide additional capital. The rapid 
increases in regulatory bank capital requirements, now expected in the wake of 
the global financial crisis, will stretch bank balance sheets and to force them to 
forgo some value creating but relatively low return on capital opportunities. But 
such balance sheet pressures makes a switch to exposure specific RAROC hurdles 
all the more worthwhile. As we discuss in the context of our Table 4.5, when a 
financial institution is subject to balance sheet constraints then the efficient 
allocation of capital requires that they apply not one but two performance 
thresholds, as in our final equation (3.9). The first – the exposure specific RAROC 
hurdle – is needed to capture market wide systematic risk while the second – a 
required surplus RAROC – is needed to reflect the impact of institution specific  
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balance sheet constraints. Only by distinguishing these two costs of risk can the 
value created by different investment exposures be accurately measured and 
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Technical details of the calculations reported in Tables 4.1–4.5. 
 
•  The Mathematica notebook supporting this paper contains derivations of all 
results in this Appendix and the calculations of all Tables. 
•  For Tables 4.1–4.3 where we assume that all investors have quadratic 
preferences, the required (zero NPV) return on portfolio i from equation 5 
becomes ri = rf + ρimσiσm (since with quadratic preferences ρiz = –ρim and 
σz = σm). Evaluating 5 for the case where the asset portfolio i is the market 
portfolio m and so ρim = ρmm = 1, yields rm = rf + σmσz and hence the standard 
CAPM relationship ri = rf + ρimσi(rm – rf)/σm = rf + βi(rm – rf). 
•  The end period expected return and standard deviation of return of equity is 




i + = φ + =
+∞
∞ −  and 
)) q s ( 2 exp( dZ ) Z ( ] r ) sZ q [exp(
2 2
i i + = φ − + = σ  , where φ(Z) is the standard 
normal density. 
•  The market portfolio is assumed to be that offered by the equity portfolio (the 
equity portfolio is fully diversified). Hence for the equity porfolio σi = σm and 
ri = rm and we can use these relationships to obtain expressions for both q and 









m s )] r 1 log[( q − + = . 
•  Tables 4.4 and 4.5 assume a representative investor with constant relative risk 
aversion ie with expected utility given by  γ − φ +
γ − dZ ) 1 /( ) Z ( )] sZ q [exp(
1  and 
who hence places a marginal valuation on returns in state of the world Z of 
γ − + )] sZ q [exp( . Here γ is the investors’ coefficient of relative risk aversion. 




f γ − γ − + + =
γ − , is 
this marginal valuation rescaled so that 
1
f) r 1 ( ] z [ E
− + = . The covariance of 
equity returns with the pricing kernel is then given by 
) r 1 /( ) 1 s )(exp s ) 1 ( q ) 1 exp(( f
2 2 2
mz + − γ γ − + γ − − = σ . Using equation (3.5), 







1 s / )) r r )( r 1 ( ) s q log(exp( s / q 
2
f m f s / ) r r )( r 1 ( − + . This expression is used to determine γ as a function of rf, 
rm and σm for the calculations of Table 4.4. 
•  The returns on portfolios of risky (defaultable) debt are determined by the 
same aggregate factor Z as the equity portfolio according to the single 
aggregate factor asymptotic Vasicek model (the standard model of credit 
portfolio returns used for the IRB calculations in the Basel II accord), in 
which an individual obligor j defaults if  K 1 Z a j
5 . 0
j < ε ω − + ω =  where εj is 
the specific risk of each individual counterparty. From this model, the  
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portfolio return, conditional on a particular outcome for the aggregate risk 
factor Z, is  ) 1 / ) Z ) PD ( N (( N * LGD 1 ) 1 ( A ) 1 ( R ) Z (
5 . 0 1
i i ω − ω − − = + = θ
−  and 
LGD PD 1 ) 1 ( Ri × − = . PD is the default probability for the various debt 
classes; and ω is the correlation of underling asset values within the portfolio 
(so ω
0.5 is the correlation of each asset with the market factor). Z is the same 
aggregate risk factor determining equity portfolio returns. 
•  Tables 4.1–4.3 use numerical integration to calculate the CAPM pricing 
inputs for debt, the standard deviation of the debt portfolio and its correlation 
with the market portfolio. The formulas are:  dZ ) Z ( )] 1 ( R ) Z ( [
2
i i φ − θ = σ   
and ) /( dZ ) Z ( )] 1 ( R ) Z ( ][ r ) sZ q [exp( m i i im σ σ φ − θ − + = ρ  . 
•  Tables 4.4 and 4.5 use numerical integration to compute the covariance of 
debt returns with the pricing kernel 
dZ ) Z ( )] 1 ( R ) Z ( [ ] r ) sZ q [exp( i
/ 1
iz φ − θ − + = σ 
γ − , yielding required returns 
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